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Contrived Defenses and Deterrent Threats:
Two Facets of One Problem
Claire Finkelstein ∗ & Leo Katz ∗∗
What relation do the various parts of a plan bear to the overall aim of
the plan? In this essay we consider this question in the context of two very
different problems in the criminal law. The first, known in the German
criminal law literature as the Actio Libera in Causa, involves defendants
who contrive to commit crimes under conditions that would normally afford
them a justification or excuse. The question is whether such defendants
should be allowed to claim the defense when the defense is itself either
contrived or anticipated in advance. The second is what we call the
question of deterrent threats: is it permissible to threaten to do more than it
is actually permissible to do, in order to deter the wrongdoing of another?
Furthermore, if it is permissible to issue such a threat, does it then become
permissible to follow through on it when the threat fails to deter, thus
rendering permissible an action that would otherwise be impermissible?
These two problems—the problem of contrived defenses and the problem of
deterrent threats—appear to be mirror images of one other. The first
involves a morally permissible act embedded in an immoral course of
conduct, while the second involves a morally impermissible act embedded
in a moral course of conduct. The question we raise is whether the larger
plan or course of conduct should help to determine the character of the
individual acts that constitute that plan, and whether there is a consistent
approach to plans and their component parts that provides plausible
answers to legal questions of both sorts.
I. INTRODUCTION
What is the relationship between a complex whole and the individual parts that
constitute it? In particular, when do the characteristics of the larger entity carry over
to the characteristics of its components? In the physical world, the answer is—rarely.
∗
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The molecules of a blue object are not themselves blue; the molecules of liquids are
not themselves wet; the sides of triangles are not themselves triangular, and so on.
But is it the same with complex normative properties? 1
We will focus on situations in which someone makes a plan involving several
different steps. On the one hand, we could ask whether the plan, taken as a whole, is
morally or legally permissible. On the other hand, we could ask about each action
required by the plan, whether it is morally or legally permissible. The problem that
concerns us is whether the answer we give to the first question is necessarily the same
as the answer we give to the second question: If the plan as a whole is morally (or
legally) permissible, should we expect the same to be true of all its subparts?
Conversely, if all the subparts of a plan are morally (or legally) acceptable, should we
expect the same to hold of the overall plan?
We will address this topic in two different contexts. The first is the problem of
defendants who manufacture the conditions of their own defense, which German
criminal law scholars have dubbed the problem of the Actio Libera in Causa.2 The
standard example is the case of the defendant who deliberately drinks himself into a
state of irresponsibility in order to commit a crime while in that state. The question
raised by such cases is whether the fact that the defendant’s action is part of an overall
plan should lead one to evaluate the action differently from the way one would if one
were to consider it in isolation. In particular, should we deny the defendant a defense
we would otherwise grant because the defense is claimed in the context of a plan to
produce it? 3
1

G.E. Moore famously argued that complex normative entities often form what he called
“organic unities,” in which the quality attributable to the entity as a whole could not in turn be attributed
to its component subparts. G. E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA ch. 1, § 18 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1903). In
effect, the question we are raising is to what extent a plan forms an organic unity with respect to
characteristics like permissibility or rationality relative to its constituent elements.
2
See MICHAEL HETTINGER, DIE „ACTIO LIBERA IN CAUSA“: STRAFBARKEIT WEGEN BEGEHUNGSTAT
TROTZ SCHULDUNFAEHIGKEIT? EINE HISTORISCH-DOGMATISCHE UNTERSUCHING (1988); JOACHIM
HRUSCHKA, STRAFRECHT NACH LOGISCH-ANALYTISCHER METHODE (1983); U. NEUMANN, ZURECHNUNG
UND VORVERSCHULDEN (1985); DOROTHEE SYDOW, DIE ACTIO LIBERA IN CAUSA NACH DEM
RECHTSPRECHUNGSWANDEL DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS (2002); HUBERT STÜHLER, DIE ACTIO LIBERA IN
CAUSA DE LEGE LATA UND DE LEGE FERENDA: EINE ANALYSE VON RECHTSPRECHUNG UND LITERATUR
VERBUNDEN MIT EINEM GESETZGEBUNGSVORSCHLAG (1999); RENÉ ZENKER, ACTIO LIBERA IN CAUSA: EIN
PARADOXON ALS ÖFFENTLICHER STRAFANSPRUCH IN EINEM VOM SCHULPRINZIP GEPRÄGTEN RECHTSSTAAT
(2003). The problem has received little attention in Anglo-American criminal law theory, with the
notable exception of MIRIAM GUR-ARYE, THE ACTIO LIBERA IN CAUSA (1984); MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT
AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 35–36 (1993); Paul
H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal
Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 n.6 (1985); see also Claire Finkelstein, Involuntary Crimes,
Voluntarily Committed, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 147 (Stephen
Shute & A.P. Simister eds., 2002); LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS, at pt.I (1996).
3
A related problem is raised by defendants who are aware of, but do not contrive, the conditions
of their own defense, which the Germans have dubbed the Actio Illicita in Causa. The difference
between the Actio Libera in Causa and the Actio Illicita in Causa will not be important for our purposes,
so we will treat such cases together.
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The mirror image of the Actio Libera in Causa is raised by what we shall call the
problem of deterrent threats. Is it permissible for a person to threaten to use more
force than it is in fact permissible for him to use? And if so, does the issuance of a
sincere deterrent threat which fails to deter make it in turn permissible to execute the
threat so issued? In the criminal law, the question can be raised in the context of the
use of deadly force to protect property. While it is normally not permissible to use
deadly force merely to protect property, it may be permissible to threaten to use such
force as a way of deterring potential wrongdoers from theft or other property crimes.
The issue has also been raised in other contexts, notably in the literature discussing the
morality (and rationality) of the United States policy of nuclear deterrence during the
Cold War. 4 Against the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction, the argument was
often made that it could not be moral to issue a threat on which it would not be moral
to act. And since surely it would not be moral to launch a weapon of mass
destruction, it could not be moral to threaten to do so either. If, however, it makes
sense to evaluate actions that occur in the context of plans differently from those same
actions when they are self-standing, then issuing and eventually following through on
deterrent threats of the above sort may look more acceptable than it otherwise would.
While our two contexts are quite different, they display a surprising symmetry.
The Actio Libera involves seemingly innocent, or at least excusable, actions
embedded in an overall wicked plan. And the question we must ask is whether the
plan’s wickedness should be imputed to the otherwise innocent conduct to inculpate
the defendant, who otherwise would have had an excuse or justification. The logic of
deterrent threats, by contrast, involves seemingly immoral conduct embedded in an
overall moral, or at least permissible, plan. The question in this case is whether the
plan’s justifiable character should be imputed to the otherwise immoral conduct to
exculpate the defendant, who otherwise would have been guilty of a crime. 5 Both
problems raise the question of whether the larger plan should play a role in assessing
the individual actions that help to constitute it. Exploring these two types of plans—
contrived defenses and deterrent threats—may not provide a definitive answer to the
problem of the relation between plans and their component parts, but it should at least
allow us to trace a set of consistent responses to cases of this sort.
In Part II of this Essay, we will sketch the Actio Libera problem. While this
problem has been extensively written about elsewhere, our aim here is merely to
summarize and clarify the existing debate and to indicate reasons for favoring one
approach over others. In Part III, we will turn to the problem of deterrent threats. As
in the case of the Actio Libera in Causa, we believe there is reason to favor one
approach to the morality of deterrent threats over others. In Part IV, we will attempt
to articulate the parallels between the Actio Libera in Causa and the deterrent threat
situations in greater detail. In so doing, we hope to show that the favored solution to
4

See, e.g., GREGORY S. KAVKA, MORAL PARADOXES OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 16–21 (1987).
Some aspects of the relationship between these kinds of cases were discussed in Leo Katz, Preempting Oneself: The Right and the Duty to Forestall One’s Own Wrongdoing, 5 LEG. THEORY 339
(1999).
5
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the Actio Libera in Causa problem receives support from the plan-based approach we
sketch in the context of deterrent threats, and that the reverse is also true. We
conclude in Part V.
II. THE ACTIO LIBERA IN CAUSA
The Actio Libera in Causa is the name German criminal law scholars have given
to situations in which a defendant arranges to commit a crime by rendering himself
mentally irresponsible. 6 In addition to the defendant who drinks in order to carry out
a crime while drunk, examples might include: the person who has himself hypnotized
so that he will murder his wife while in a trance; the defendant who intentionally
places himself in a situation in which he knows he will be coerced into committing a
crime he otherwise wants to commit; or, more colorfully, the defendant who has
himself shot out of the mouth of a cannon and into the window of a jewelry store he
intends to burgle. The doctrine has also been generalized to justification defenses,
such as the person who provokes another to attack him in order to be able to kill the
latter in self-defense, or the person who sets a forest fire so that he can later claim a
justification for burning someone else’s property to create a firebreak. 7
A related doctrine, known as the Actio Illicita in Causa, encompasses defendants
who perform actions knowing, rather than intending, that they are likely to lapse into
an irresponsible state. 8 Examples include the defendant who drives knowing he is
subject to epileptic seizures, or the person who exposes himself to his enemy knowing
he is likely to lose control and attack him. These defendants create, as Paul Robinson
aptly puts it, “the conditions of [their] own defense.” 9 The question is whether
defendants in this position should be permitted to avail themselves of the defense they
have thus anticipated. In what follows, we will consider three approaches that have
been offered to this problem. The first of these solutions has thus far dominated the
literature, and thus we consider it most extensively.
A. The Traditional Solution
The traditional solution to the Actio Libera (or Actio Illicita) in Causa problem
would deny the strategically intoxicated or strategically provoking defendant his
defense. 10 The argument for denying the defense is most powerful where result
crimes are concerned. If we are dealing with a homicide, for example, the defendant’s
action of getting drunk inaugurates a chain of events culminating in the victim’s
death. The original action of getting drunk takes the place of pulling the trigger of a
gun pointed at the victim, and because at that very moment the defendant is still sober
6
7
8
9
10

Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 147.
See Robinson, supra note 2, at 3–4.
Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 147 n.10; Robinson, supra note 2, at 37–38.
Robinson, supra note 2, at 2.
Id. at 4–8.
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and fully responsible, we have no problem holding him liable for murder. 11 The
defendant himself is like a “bullet in flight,” and though he must still engage in a
series of involuntary bodily movements in order to carry out the crime, he is fully
responsible for those movements, given that they were caused by his own earlier act
of getting drunk.
Michael Moore explains the traditional approach thus:
[I]f, from the big bang that apparently began this show to the heat death of
the universe that will end it, the court can find a voluntary act by the
defendant, accompanied at that time by whatever culpable mens rea that is
required, which act in fact and proximately causes some legally prohibited
state of affairs, then the defendant is prima facie liable for that legal harm . .
. . If there is any point in time where the act and mens rea requirements are
simultaneously satisfied, and from which the requisite causal relations exist
to some legally prohibited state of affairs, then the defendant is prima facie
liable. 12
The same point can be extended to cases of contrived justification defenses. If
the defendant intentionally provoked his attacker in order to be able to attack him in
supposed self-defense, the defendant caused his own need for self-defense by that
earlier act. Because the defendant possessed the requisite mens rea at the earlier
moment at which he voluntarily and intentionally caused himself to attack, he is liable
for the attack, and the claim of self-defense should be unavailable to him. In the
German criminal law literature, this is known as the Vorverlegungstheorie (the
“prepositioning theory”) or the Tatbestandsmodell (the “elements of the crime
model”). 13
For the most part, American criminal codes display an unsystematic version of
the traditional approach. In the Model Penal Code, for example, the problem is not
conceived as a whole. Rather, there is periodic mention of a contriving or aware
defendant who creates the conditions of his own defense. The Model Penal Code’s
self-defense provision denies the actor the use of lethal force if he provoked the use of
force against himself in the same encounter. 14 The duress provision denies the
defendant the defense if he placed himself in a position in which he knew he might be
subjected to duress. 15 The Code’s account of necessity is similar and provides that the
defendant foregoes the defense of necessity if he was negligent or reckless in creating
the situation that required him to violate the law. 16 The defendant can then be
11
12
13
14
15
16

Id. at 7.
MOORE, supra note 2, at 35–36.
See sources cited supra note 2.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (1985).
Id. § 2.09(2).
Id. § 3.02(2).
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convicted of a related crime for which the mens rea of negligence or recklessness
suffices.
While the traditional approach seems a sensible one, over time many difficulties
with it have emerged. 17 Although none of the objections deals the approach a mortal
blow, together they significantly diminish its attractiveness. We will summarize these
difficulties below. 18
The first problem with the traditional approach appears when one attempts to
apply that solution to conduct crimes. Consider a crime like burglary, which requires
the defendant to have “enter[ed] a building . . . with purpose to commit a crime
therein.” 19 Can the defendant be said to satisfy this act definition in the case in which
he had himself shot from the mouth of a cannon? Although he did enter a building
with intent to commit a crime, he did not do so voluntarily, since he was in an
irresponsible state at the time. What about the fact that he was in a fully responsible
state when he arranged to have himself hypnotized in order to commit a burglary, as
the traditional approach would have it? The problem with this earlier moment is that
he did not enter a building at that time, since getting oneself hypnotized is not itself
entering a building. So the trouble is that at the earlier moment in time, T1, the
defendant was responsible but he was not entering a building, and at the later moment,
T2, when the defendant was entering a building, he was not in a responsible state. To
put the problem more technically, it looks as though there is no concurrency of act and
mental state, which is required for the defendant to be liable for a crime.
The problem, then, with conduct crimes is that they require a particular action by
the defendant, such as driving, 20 having intercourse, 21 or breaking into a dwelling. 22
The importance of the defendant’s satisfying a specific conduct element for the latter
group of crimes means that a defendant who manufactures the conditions of his own
defense cannot be deemed to satisfy that element by virtue of the earlier act by which
he caused himself to perform the later illegal act. At the earlier moment in time, the
defendant is at most causing himself to do those things, which would be helpful for
liability if the crime were a result crime. But for a specific conduct offense, the
defendant is unlikely to meet the actus reus requirement on the basis of the earlier act.
Traditionalists tend to gloss over the definitional problem, treating it as a mere
drafting matter. Michael Moore, for example, suggests that there is no reason to
cleave to “stereotypes” about how criminal acts are performed: “Just as one kills by
causing death, so one rapes by causing penetration, one hits by causing contact, one
maims by causing disfigurement, and one takes by causing movement of the object
17
See Paul H. Robinson et al., Making Criminal Codes Functional: A Code of Conduct and a
Code of Adjudication, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 304, 324–27 (1996).
18
These difficulties with the traditional approach have been most clearly articulated in the
German criminal law commentary. See sources cited supra note 2.
19
MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1) (1985).
20
Id. § 223.9.
21
Id. § 213.0.
22
Id. § 221.1.
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taken.” 23 As a point about ordinary language, Moore is certainly right when it comes
to verbs like “killing.” 24 For the fact that a person does something at T1 that later
causes someone’s death at a wholly different time, T2, does not in any way interfere
with our ability to say that what is done at T1 is an instance of killing. If the defendant
places poison in his wife’s tea at T1, and his wife later drinks the tea and at T2 dies, the
defendant’s action at T1 is an instance of killing, even though his wife did not die until
T2. 25 This suggests that any number of actions performed at T1 can be “killings.”
There is no stereotypical killing, and the same can be said for “causing death.”
But the same point simply does not hold for conduct crimes. A defendant does
not have an infinite number of ways to “unlawfully enter or remain in a building,” or
“unlawfully remove property,” or “alter a writing with intent to deceive,” or “have
intercourse with a woman without her consent,” and so on. The question is how much
flexibility there is in the conduct requirement in each case. Must a person physically
place his body inside the building to enter it? Or can he be constructively deemed to
have entered it by seeing a hypnotist, drinking a potion, or getting himself shot from a
cannon? To us it seems to strain ordinary meanings to say that a person is entering a
building just because he is doing something that will later cause himself to enter a
building, especially when the thing he is doing is an action as different from entering a
building as visiting a hypnotist. Sandy Kadish has suggested that conduct crimes have
the special feature that they are “nonproxyable,” meaning that they cannot be
accomplished through the intervention of another. This is another expression of the
fact that to cause a rape is not to rape, to cause a burglary is not to burglarize, and to
cause an assault is not oneself to assault. This is a matter, not only of ordinary
language, but of morality as well. 26
The second problem with the traditional account becomes apparent when we
return to result crimes. When we examine the causal element more closely, result
crimes turn out to have the same difficulty as conduct crimes, though in different
guise. The problem is that the defendant’s action must be the proximate cause of the
victim’s death in order for him to be liable on the basis of his earlier act. 27 But many
of the cases that fall in the domain of the Actio Libera in Causa exemplify “but for,”
and not proximate, causation.
Consider the person who drinks to excess, hoping this will result in his killing his
intended victim. In order for us to be able to deny the defendant the intoxication
defense, as the traditional approach would have us do, we must be able to say his
intentionally getting drunk caused the death of the victim. But can we say this? In
23

Michael Moore, Causation and Responsibility, 16 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1, 39 (1999).
Id.
25
For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Time of a Killing, 68
J. PHIL. 115 (1971).
26
Kadish uses this feature of conduct crimes to explain the need for a law of complicity. See
Sanford Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 323, 373 (1985).
27
See Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 146–53.
24
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what sense was death “caused”? It is not enough for the defendant’s intentionally
getting drunk to be the condition without which the victim’s death would not have
occurred. This is mere “but for” causation. The defendant’s action must also have
been the proximate cause of the defendant’s death. But was it?
Legal scholars commonly identify two familiar reasons why something that is a
“but for” cause might fail to be a proximate cause: a voluntary act of another agent
intervenes between the defendant’s act and the victim’s death, or an abnormal or
highly unusual act intervenes between the two. 28 The problem for the traditional
approach is that it is possible to think of the defendant’s own later act as though it
were an intervening voluntary act of another, and hence the defendant’s own later act
could break the chain of causation. Acting in an intoxicated state, after all, is not like
being shot from a cannon. One’s actions are still voluntary, and one’s bodily
movements still susceptible to control. In such cases, we cannot think of the
defendant who drinks to excess as a “bullet in flight,” as the traditional approach
would have it. 29
Now consider the other ground for denying proximate cause, namely when an
abnormal, freakish event intervenes between the defendant’s act and the victim’s
death. The standard example is the driver who suffers a sudden epileptic seizure, as in
the New York case of People v. Decina. 30 It is clear that no driver who suffers either
an unexpected medical event that renders him unconscious or a debilitating, external
event, such as an attack by a swarm of bees, can be held liable for the ensuing
damage, given that he performs no voluntary act under these circumstances. But what
if the defendant contrived, or at least fully expected and hoped, for this loss of control
to occur?
The traditional theory would like to deny the involuntariness defense under these
circumstances, and understandably so. Why should a person who is aware of a very
substantial risk he will lapse into a diabetic coma while behind the wheel, and who
then kills someone while in that state, be able to avail himself of a defense designed
for the victim of unanticipated events? It is problematic for the traditional approach to
reach this conclusion, however, because the event is still a freakish and abnormal
event—the defendant’s awareness that it might occur does not change that fact. And
if we now attempt to say that under these circumstances the defendant really was the
proximate cause of the victim’s death, we will be making proximate cause turn on the
28

See, e.g., H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959).
The traditionalist may object by saying that only responsible behavior can vitiate responsibility
at an earlier time. If the defendant’s behavior at T2 therefore vitiates his responsibility at T1, we can hold
the defendant liable for causing the death of the victim in the ordinary way, namely on the basis of his
responsible actions at T2. Yet this solution is not as straightforward as it may seem, for the defendant
arguably still lacks the level of voluntariness required for responsibility at T2. The result may be that the
voluntariness of the behavior at T2 vitiates the defendant’s responsibility at T1, but is not itself conduct of
sufficient intention and control that it can inculpate the defendant. Much is needed beyond the minimal
requirement of voluntariness for full criminal responsibility.
30
138 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1956) (finding defendant who suffered a seizure while driving
and subsequently killed four girls guilty because defendant knew of his epileptic tendencies).
29
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defendant’s mental state. For we would be saying that if the defendant was unaware
of the ensuing condition, he did not cause the death, and if he was aware of the
condition, he did cause the death. But causation is thought to be part of the actus reus,
not mens rea, and as such it should not be affected by the defendant’s state of
knowledge. It would seem to follow that contrivance should also have no bearing on
it. 31 So either we must make causation a matter of mental state, or we must be
prepared to revise our judgment about cases involving freakish intervening events and
say that they either always or never exonerate. Neither of these options is attractive,
however, and this casts doubt on the traditional approach. 32
The traditional approach has several more minor problems, in addition to the two
main ones discussed above. First, the traditional approach appears to require that we
set the threshold for a completed attempt unreasonably early. Consider the defendant
who drinks himself into an irresponsible state, hoping and expecting that he will kill
his victim while in that state. He has taken the last responsible act toward commission
of the crime at the moment that he gets drunk. According to the traditional approach,
everything that happens after this point is mere causation. If the defendant’s act of
getting drunk does not result in the victim’s death, it looks as though the traditional
approach would have to regard him as having committed attempted murder. But
normally we would not think of getting drunk as attempted murder, and matters do not
seem significantly different if the defendant gets drunk for the purpose of committing
a homicide while intoxicated. Not only does getting drunk not seem a completed
attempt, it is not particularly clear it should constitute a substantial step. Yet this
peculiar result seems an inevitable consequence of the traditional approach.
Second, there appears to be a problem with the abandonment doctrine on this
account. The problem is that on the bullet-in-flight analogy, it is hard to see how a
defendant can change his mind and settle on a different course. Thus, on the
traditional account, if the person who intends to commit a homicide while intoxicated
drinks to excess, he has at that moment completed his attempt on the victim’s life. If
he then, inebriated though he is, decides he will not kill his victim, he should receive
no credit for the abandonment because, in theory, he exerts no further control over his
actions. Or, if Decina gets in his car and begins to drive, he should be guilty of
attempted murder even if he soon pulls over and stops driving because he decides the
trip is too risky. His “abandonment” would merely be like a bullet missing its mark,
and a defendant should not receive credit for that.
Third, the traditional approach encounters a problem with mens rea. How
exactly is one to picture the mens rea of this newfangled Actio Libera offense?
31

See Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 148–50.
Some legal philosophers defend the position that proximate cause can vary with the defendant’s
mental state, and these writers would not object to saying that Decina caused the death of the pedestrians
when he drove knowing he was subject to epileptic seizures, but that he did not cause that death when he
drove without that awareness. And it is true that the concept of proximate cause is at least partially a
normative one. But this does not by itself warrant the conclusion that proximate cause is dependent on
mental state. A concept can be normative in different ways, and dependence on mental state is only one
of them.
32
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Imagine the defendant who drinks and drinks, hoping to acquire enough courage to
carry out his intended crime. He eventually lapses into an irresponsible state in which
he has finally acquired the resolution he needs to carry out the killing. According to
the traditional account, the requisite mens rea is satisfied by the defendant’s ex ante
condition, namely the mental state he had before he started drinking. 33 That mental
state is supposed to be combined with the actus reus, which is satisfied on the basis of
the entire course of conduct. 34 Until now we have been assuming that the defendant
did indeed have the mental state required for the offense at that earlier point. But if
we think about his earlier mental state more carefully, he does not necessarily display
the intention to kill. What he displays is the intention to acquire the intention to kill.
And this is probably not sufficient for the mens rea for murder.
Finally, there is a rather elusive difficulty with the traditional approach, one that
might be considered the most crucial of all the objections we have considered thus far.
The difficulty is that the logic of finding liability for a defendant with an excusing or
justifying condition, based on some earlier act, would appear to inculpate many
defendants who ought to fall outside the scope of criminal responsibility altogether.
Consider the defendant who goes into a shop, sees a painting he hates, buys it, and
destroys it. Has he committed the crime of destroying the property of another? No, of
course not. Yet the logic of the Actio Libera, applied to this case, would suggest he
has. This defendant, like the person who manufactures an involuntariness defense,
also created the conditions of his own defense. If he had destroyed the painting prior
to acquiring it he would of course be guilty of various property offenses. Now he has
manufactured a “defense” by making sure that he owned the painting before he
destroys it. Has he not contrived a defense of consent? The problem, in other words,
is that the Actio Libera doctrine must be limited to certain kinds of scenarios. But
which scenarios and on what grounds the traditional approach fails to tell us.
The problems with the traditional approach we have considered have led many
commentators to look elsewhere for a basis for holding grand schemers liable. In
what follows, we will address the two most prominent alternatives to the traditional
approach in the secondary literature to date.
B. The Perpetration-By-Means Approach
A second approach to the Actio Libera cases is known as the mittelbare
Taeterschaft analogy, 35 or the “perpetration-by-means” approach. 36 Instead of
thinking of the defendant as a bullet in flight, we should think of him as the principal
while he is committing the crime and an accomplice to his own future self while
33

See Robinson, supra note 2, at 7–8.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (1985) (“A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being.”) (emphasis
added).
35
See note 2 and sources cited therein.
36
See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 639 (1978).
34
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preparing for the crime. The traditional approach and the perpetration-by-means
approach will usually produce the same outcome. What is striking about the latter is
not the results it produces, but the fact that the accomplice framework dissolves a
number of the conceptual difficulties that were implicit in the traditional approach.
As we shall see, however, the perpetration-by-means approach is not itself free from
objections either.
Consider first the problem of the offense definition. Recall that so-called
conduct crimes were especially problematic for the traditional approach, because of
the need to satisfy the actus reus of the crime with precision. Now consider the
accomplice liability approach. Unlike principals, accomplices are not expected to
commit the actus reus with precision; they must merely assist the principal in his
commission of the offense. 37 If we therefore think of the defendant as his own
accomplice, it should not prove an obstacle that the defendant did not precisely
perform the action required by the offense definition. As long as he possessed the
requisite mens rea for accomplice liability, and he performed an action designed to
render assistance to the principal in its performance, he could conceivably be guilty of
an offense as his own accomplice.
Consider, for example, the defendant who has himself hypnotized to commit a
burglary. The problem we saw with the traditional approach is that getting hypnotized
is not “entering a building,” 38 and so at the moment that the defendant has the
requisite mental state for the offense, and is in control of his actions, he has not
performed the required action under the offense definition for burglary. But suppose
A hypnotizes B to make sure that B will enter a residence and steal a television while
inside. There would be no difficulty holding A liable for burglary as B’s accomplice,
despite the fact that A does not himself enter the building or otherwise satisfy the
offense definition for burglary. A would be liable as B’s accomplice for doing
something that promotes B’s satisfaction of the offense definition. Of course, if B is
truly rendered irresponsible by the hypnosis, he may qualify as an innocent agent. But
this variation of accomplice liability would not serve to absolve A of liability. If
anything it only deepens his responsibility. 39 A is thus liable for burglary, despite the
fact that he never personally performed the actions required under the offense
definition. Applying this same doctrine to the case of contrived defenses, we need
only think of the defendant at T1 as the accomplice of his persona at T2, and suddenly
the offense definition does not stand in the way of liability for the defendant’s T1
self. 40
37

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (1985) (“A person is an accomplice of another person in the
commission of an offense if: (a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
offense, he . . . (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it . . . .”).
38
See supra Part I.
39
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2) (1985) (“A person is legally accountable for the conduct of
another person when: (a) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the
offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct.”).
40
Arguably, the theory works somewhat less well in the case in which one contrives to place
oneself in a situation of provoked self-defense. This is because ordinarily accomplices share in the
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Next we considered the problem of causal contribution, which we saw was
difficult to establish on the traditional approach, given the possibility that the
defendant’s own later act might count as an intervening event that would break the
chain of causation. The perpetration-by-means approach fares significantly better
than the traditional approach here as well. Accomplices are not required to make an
actual causal contribution to the crime in order to be liable for it. 41 And this suggests,
although it does not conclusively establish, that the fact that there is a causal break
due to an intervening action or abnormal event may not serve to exonerate the
defendant if he is thought of as an accomplice.
Now let us turn to the more minor difficulties we saw with the traditional
approach, namely the attempt, abandonment, and mens rea problems. Under the
traditional approach, the concern arose that we would be forced to draw the line
between preparation and attempt at an unduly early stage in order to avoid exonerating
contrivers, thus incidentally enlarging the category of conduct that would count as an
attempt. On the perpetration-by-means approach, there is substantial improvement on
the attempt problem. For relatively small contributions on the part of the
“accomplice” can supply a basis for liability, and hence can give us a reason for
denying the contriver his defense. Notice that we do not need to be able to say that
the defendant is liable for an attempt in order to reach this result. The category of
attempt can therefore remain untouched on this approach to the Actio Libera in Causa
problem.
With respect to abandonment, it looks as though the difficulties we saw with the
traditional approach have also been eliminated. Recall that on the traditional approach
it is difficult to make sense of the abandonment doctrine, since bullets-in-flight cannot
abandon their course of action. On the perpetration-by-means approach, there is no
problem with abandonment, since the principal is free to abandon his criminal plans
even if the accomplice has done his part. Insofar as accomplice liability is derivative,
many courts would in turn allow the accomplice to receive credit for the change of
heart of the principal. 42 But the matter remains controversial and does not affect the
justification defenses available to principals, whereas they do not share in excuses. Thus the
“accomplice” in the case of contrived self-defense might also have a justification of self-defense if the
principal does, and we would therefore be unable to hold the first actor, the contriver, liable if the second
actor, the principal, has a valid justification defense. Presumably, however, the account can still be made
to work if the principle that justifications generalize to third parties is thought to fail where such
justifications are created only through the accomplice’s malicious exposure of the principal to a situation
in which he would need to use self-defense to survive. In this situation, the principal becomes a type of
innocent agent once again, as he is effectively innocent of the grand schemer’s plans.
41
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) cmt. 6 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (noting
that once it is proved that the defendant purposely promoted or facilitated the offense in question, there is
no longer “occasion to inquire into the precise extent of influence exerted on the ultimate commission of
the crime”). See also State ex rel. Martin v. Tally, 15 So. 722, 738 (Ala. 1894) (“The assistance given . . .
need not contribute to the criminal result in the sense that but for it the result would not have ensued.”).
42
Cf. State v. Hayes, 16 S.W. 514, 516 (Mo. 1891) (suggesting that defenses available to the
principal are also available to the accomplice because the accomplice’s liability derives from the
principal’s liability). In Hayes, to facilitate the defendant’s arrest, the would-be principal feigned an
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basic soundness of accounting for abandonment on the perpetration-by-means
approach. 43
Despite improvements with respect to four of the problems we considered with
the traditional approach, the drawbacks of that approach re-emerge with the final two
difficulties—the mens rea problem and the ad hoc limitation. With respect to the
mens rea issue, we even have a new problem with the accomplice liability approach.
Unlike ordinary crimes, complicity has a very narrow and strict mens rea requirement:
in most cases it requires intention. 44 Applying this feature to the perpetration-bymeans approach would limit liability to offenses with the required mens rea. We
could, of course, side with scholars who think that the mens rea for accomplice
liability should not be thus constrained, in order to broaden the class of crimes in
which we can find liability. But then we will have distorted current accomplice
liability doctrine for the sake of a particular approach to the Actio Libera in Causa
problem, and this seems to get things backwards. Thus, at least with respect to the
mens rea problem, the perpetration-by-means doctrine does not seem to improve our
ability to reach intuitive results in the cases we have considered.
The problem of ad hoc limitations is similarly troubling. Like the traditional
approach, the complicity approach would require some ad hoc limitations, though not
necessarily in the same cases. Consider again the defendant who goes into a shop,
sees a painting he hates, buys it, and destroys it. Under the perpetration-by-means
approach we have no trouble reaching the desired result, namely an acquittal of the
defendant. He is aiding “another” in the commission of a perfectly legal act, the
destruction of his very own painting. But other cases yield odd results.
Consider the following example offered by Joachim Hruschka. A defendant
takes a drug that allows him to testify untruthfully but in a state of irresponsibility.
Presumably the proponents of a complicity approach would like to convict, but the
complicity approach may not allow them to reach that result. That is because in the
case in which A gives B some drug that will cause him to lie, neither A nor B would be
liable for perjury. A is not liable because perjury, occurring as it does under oath, is a
“nonproxyable” offense. 45 And B is not liable because of his irresponsible state. The

agreement with the defendant to burglarize a store. The court held that the defendant could not be liable
as an accomplice because the principal lacked the mental state necessary for the commission of the crime
and, therefore, the crime was not actually committed. Id.
43
Compare Hayes, 16 S.W. at 516, with Model Penal Code § 5.01(3), which states:
[a] person who engages in conduct designed to aid another to commit a crime that would
establish his complicity under Section 2.06 if the crime were committed by such other
person, is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime, although the crime is not committed or
attempted by such other person.
(emphasis added.) Although the principal may be excused from having attempted a crime by his
subsequent abandonment, the Model Penal Code would still hold the accomplice liable for the principal’s
attempt. Id.
44
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1985).
45
See Kadish, supra note 26, at 373 and accompanying text.
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problem of ad hoc limitations will thus rear its head again under the perpetration-bymeans approach, albeit in different guise.
If it were just the two problems discussed so far—the problem with mens rea and
that of ad hoc limitations—one might be motivated to find a solution in order to stick
with the perpetration-by-means approach. But unfortunately that approach has at least
one other serious drawback, one more fundamental than those discussed so far: the
perpetration-by-means approach erroneously presupposes that when the defendant
cooperates with himself to commit a crime, his blameworthiness must be the same as
if he cooperated with another person. That is why the analogy is supposed to work.
But that need not be the case. Indeed, a defendant’s liability is often dramatically
different from what it would ordinarily be when he cooperates with an accomplice
than when he acts alone.
Take the early stages of a criminal attempt, in a case in which the crime is
supposed to be carried out by the perpetrator with the help of an accomplice. Let us
suppose that A has paid B to kill C. And let us imagine that although A has already
paid, B has not yet taken any steps towards killing C, and has only just received the
money. Under prevailing approaches, A would be guilty of an attempt on the basis of
his solicitation, despite the fact that B could not be guilty of attempted murder on the
mere basis of receiving the money. After all, A has already performed his last act
towards the completion of the crime, and this weighs heavily in favor of liability. By
contrast, if A has merely paid out sums of money in preparation for committing the
crime—for example for the purchase of weapons or other equipment needed to
commit the killing—he would in all likelihood not be guilty of an attempt, as his acts
might not be sufficient to count as substantial steps. Thus, adding the extra actor
serves to increase the defendant’s blameworthiness, because it has the effect of
lowering the threshold required for criminal activity. While we are not suggesting
that every case of accomplice liability makes it easier to find liability than every case
of singular criminal activity, the above example shows that in many cases there will
be such an effect, and thus the perpetration-by-means analogy would be an unreliable
guide to the culpability of single actors.
C. Hruschka’s Ausnahmemodell
We turn now to the third approach to the Actio Libera in Causa problem, namely
Joachim Hruschka’s Ausnahmemodell, which revives an older approach in German
law. 46 Because the approach has not yet been developed in any great detail, we will
deal with it here more briefly than the others. It may, however, prove the most
promising of all the approaches proposed thus far.
Hruschka distinguishes between two levels of imputation for criminal acts. First
there is imputation of responsibility according to the traditional criteria of the General
Part. Then there is what is called “extraordinary imputation,” which applies in cases
in which the defendant creates his own disability. In such cases, Hruschka argues, the
46

See HRUSCHKA, supra note 2, at chs.1 & 4.
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defendant should be found to have breached a prior and entirely separate obligation,
namely the obligation not to place oneself in a position in which one may have to
violate the law. The defendant thus possesses not only the primary duty not to burn
someone else’s property, for example, but he also possesses the duty not to place
himself in a position in which he might have to burn someone else’s property to
prevent a greater evil. That is, in addition to his primary duties, he possesses a
secondary duty never to manufacture his own defense by placing himself in a situation
in which doing so should become necessary. But the breach of this secondary duty in
and of itself triggers no liability. It is only when that breach eventuates in harm that it
becomes relevant to liability. It then acts as an estoppel to raising the disability that
resulted from this breach as a defense. The defendant effectively forfeits his excuse or
justification by manufacturing the conditions under which it must be asserted. 47
Suppose a defendant makes himself temporarily insane by taking a pill that he
knows will make him both crazy and violent. He takes it in the presence of his
intended victim, hoping it will make him try to kill that person. And lo and behold, he
does kill the victim, and later pleads temporary insanity. Hruschka’s point is that the
defendant should be estopped from claiming insanity as a disability, given that he
violated another duty in taking the pill. The duty he violated was a second order duty
not to do anything that would cause himself, or run a risk of causing himself, to
violate his first order duty not to kill. The violation of the latter, secondary duty
creates a basis for extraordinary imputation: the responsibility for killing his victim is
now imputed to the defendant, on the grounds that he has forfeited any basis he had
for claiming the insanity defense.
Hruschka appears not to be vulnerable to any of the objections mounted against
the two other approaches we have considered. This is in part by fiat, because he
declares the doctrines that create problems for the other theories inapplicable in the
context of extraordinary imputation. Hruschka’s account avoids the definitional
problem, for example, because he does not limit punishment to cases in which the
defendant failed to comply with the explicit statutory prohibition. That is, Hruschka
does not preclude the possibility of punishing an agent who violated his secondary
duty not to manufacture defenses, despite the fact that the defendant technically
cannot be found to have violated any statutory norm. Nor are the objections based on
doctrines of the General Part, such as attempt, abandonment, and mens rea applicable
to Hruschka’s account. Hruschka maintains that when extraordinary rules of
imputation apply, the ordinary rules of imputation of the General Part are suspended.
For this reason, the ordinary rules governing when a defendant is guilty of an attempt,
etc., simply have no applicability to cases of contrived defenses.
While Hruschka’s approach may be free from the problems we saw with the
traditional approach, there are questions about the account that remain unanswered.
Why, exactly, do we suspend the principles of the General Part when it comes to
47

Hruschka would then apply this approach to cases involving excused, as opposed to justified,
misconduct. He does not, however, rule out its possible extension to certain kinds of justificatory cases,
such as contrived self-defense.
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extraordinary imputation? Hruschka appeals to the intuitively compelling nature of
the results we reach when we apply the idea of extraordinary imputation and the fact
that the other accounts reach less appealing outcomes. But whether Hruschka’s
analysis of what the other views would hold about particular cases is correct is not
clear. For example, he thinks the traditional account must acquit in cases in which the
defendant drinks himself into a state of irresponsibility. And it is true that, as we have
seen, significant obstacles are in the way of conviction under the traditional account. 48
But traditionalists think they can explain why the law would still convict in such a
case, and thus it is not clear how to interpret the traditional account in such cases.
It may also be that Hruschka is vulnerable to a version of the ad hoc objection we
found applicable to the two other accounts. As we saw earlier, the principles of
imputation that impose liability in the Actio Libera in Causa must be sharply limited,
otherwise they will apply in all sorts of instances in which we clearly would not want
them to apply, like the customer who buys an item of value that he then proceeds to
destroy. Hruschka’s principles of extraordinary imputation might apply to that case as
well, with the absurd result that the defendant would in fact be liable. Hruschka
would of course say that in this case, unlike cases of contrived intoxication and the
like, there is simply no extraordinary imputation. But he offers no account of the
boundaries of extraordinary imputation from which such a conclusion could be drawn.
We have explored the problem of contrived defenses in rather great detail. We
must now put this discussion to one side while we consider a second problem—the
problem of deterrent threats. We will return to the Actio Libera in Causa in Section
IV where we undertake to relate our two topics to one another.
III. THE PROBLEM OF DETERRENT THREATS
A problem we will somewhat imprecisely call the problem of deterrent threats
has repeatedly engaged the attention of moral philosophers and criminal law scholars.
The central question it addresses is whether it is permissible to threaten to use more
force to deter another’s wrongdoing than it is permissible actually to use. Let us
consider a common situation in which this problem might arise.
Suppose a man is defending his property against a thief. What sort of force is the
man permitted to use? The answer is that he may use whatever force is necessary to
prevent the wrong, but within sharply defined limits. He may not generally use
deadly force merely to protect property, unless his person, or his domicile are also
under attack. 49 While this limitation on the use of deadly force might be debated, we
will take the restriction for granted, at least in the first instance.
There are three different questions that arise in this context, all of which we will
consider as part and parcel of the problem of deterrent threats. The first is as follows:
even though it is not permissible for the property owner to use deadly force in defense
of his property, would it nevertheless be permissible for him to threaten to use deadly
48
49

See supra Part I.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(d) (1985).
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force? May he, for example, brandish a weapon and say: “If you don’t drop that
television set, I will shoot”? The natural, and most widely maintained view, is that he
is allowed to threaten to use more force than he is allowed to use in this context.
Threatening to use deadly force is not equivalent to using it. 50 This position is clearly
defensible in the case of a bluffing threat. If, for example, the property owner has no
intention of actually using such force, then surely he is allowed to bluff in order to
deter a potential malefactor from committing his misdeed.
But suppose he is not bluffing, and that his threat to use deadly force should his
threat fail to deter is sincere. Is he permitted sincerely to threaten to do what he is not
permitted actually to do? One is tempted to extend the answer from the insincere
threat: A threat is not the same as the use of actual force, and while lethal force to
protect property is surely disproportionate, a deterrent threat to use such force
arguably is not. The prohibition in this case is not on the intention the property owner
forms to use lethal force, but rather on the actual use of such force. While there is
admittedly a problem with avoiding the use of force once a sincere threat to use it has
been issued, that is arguably more of a causal problem than a moral one. If issuing a
sincere threat to use deadly force is possible, in the face of the knowledge that actually
using such force is not permissible, then issuing such a threat is arguably permissible.
Moreover, notice that issuing a threat is particularly justifiable if the threat is
likely to be effective, since that will reduce the probability of having to follow through
on the threat, given that the property owner thereby minimizes the probability of
wrongdoing on the part of others. Thus threatening as a form of prevention, even
threatening to do what it is not permissible to do, is arguably justifiable as a minimally
invasive way of defending against rights violations.
On the other hand, many philosophers have taken the position that it is never
permissible sincerely to threaten to do that which it is not permissible actually to do. 51
The moral quality of the threat, they think, depends on the act actually threatened.
This position may receive support from the law of attempt, for arguably the property
owner could be found guilty of an attempt on the basis of his threat alone. If
conditionally intending to use deadly force is the equivalent of intending to use it, 52
and if brandishing a weapon counts as a substantial step in the direction of using such
force (as it arguably does), then the person threatening to use deadly force would be
guilty of attempted murder. Let us call the position that the permissibility of the threat
depends on the permissibility of the act threatened the Backward Induction View.
Now there are reasonable objections to the Backward Induction View. First,
there is much support for the view that conditionally intending to do something is not
50

The Model Penal Code specifically excludes brandishing a weapon from the definition of
deadly force. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(2) (1985) (“A threat to cause death or serious bodily
injury, by the production of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the actor’s purpose is limited to creating an
apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, does not constitute deadly force.”).
51
See, e.g., ANTHONY KENNY, THE LOGIC OF DETERRENCE (1985).
52
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(6) (1985) (“When a particular purpose is an element of an
offense, the element is established although such purpose is conditional, unless the condition negatives
the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.”).

496

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 5:479

the same as intending to do it. Second, on the attempt argument, there is arguably a
problem in the low probability cases with substantial step liability: If brandishing a
weapon were so inherently unlikely to result in using that weapon, the threat perhaps
should not count as a substantial step in the direction of an actual killing. Arguably,
to use the Model Penal Code’s language, such conduct would not then be “strongly
corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.” 53 From a broader moral point of view,
one can say that the defendant is engaging in an act that has an ostensibly high
probability of a favorable outcome—deterring a theft—and a very small risk of a
deadly outcome. This makes it not too different from other risky forms of defensive
measures deemed acceptable, such as allowing police officers to bear arms. Once
again, the more effective the threat, the more likely it is to deter another’s
wrongdoing, and thus the further it will be from the actual use of deadly force, and the
closer to a non-aggressive means of protecting one’s property.
Now let us assume that it is in fact permissible to threaten more force than it is
permissible to use. This makes it possible to ask a further question: Would it be
permissible to install a mechanical device, such as a spring gun, as a way of making
such a threat credible? On the one hand, it seems difficult to see how such a device
could be legitimate, if the action of the spring gun would not be permissible were it
performed by a human agent. Presumably, if the use of deadly force to protect
property is impermissible, then using a spring gun that would automatically inflict the
same force would not be permissible either. There are, however, several interesting
arguments in favor of the permissibility of spring guns or comparable mechanical
devices in this context.
First, it is still possible to argue that like the threat, the use of the device does not
itself constitute deadly force. Deadly force is so-named not merely because there is
some possibility of death, but because there is a significant possibility that someone
might die, combined with an intent on the part of the agent to inflict lethal harm or at
least serious bodily injury. If setting up a spring gun has deterrent benefit, it may
once again increase the effectiveness of the threat, which will minimize the likelihood
of actually having to use deadly force. A threat to use deadly force, backed up by a
mechanical device, may also be seen as an attempt to avoid the use of actual deadly
force. And if the issuance of a sincere threat to use deadly force is permissible, then
the issuance of such a threat, aided by an automatic retaliation device, is also
permissible.
An even stronger argument in favor of the permissibility of spring guns and their
ilk is suggested by Larry Alexander in his celebrated article on doomsday machines. 54
Imagine a property owner who decides to hide his property in some dangerous spot, a
mountain top, a cave with wild animals in it, a hole full of snakes, the top of a hard to
reach armoire, etc. The thief calls up the owner and tells him that he is determined to
get to the property or die trying. Does the owner have a duty to move the property to
53

MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (1985).
See Lawrence Alexander, The Doomsday Machine: Proportionality, Punishment and
Prevention, 63 MONIST 199 (1980).
54
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a more accessible place? And if not, as he surely does not, how is moving the
property to a dangerous location morally different from using a spring gun to create a
similarly dangerous situation? If the property owner knows that the thief will keep
trying to steal his property to the bitter end, does that not make the property owner as
responsible for the thief’s death as he would be in the case of a spring gun? Put
another way, if it is not impermissible to protect one’s property by placing it on a high
mountain top where the air is thin, or to place it where it is protected by dangerous
animals, then surely it is not impermissible to protect it with a spring gun, provided,
once again, that potential thieves are clearly informed of the presence of the gun.
Alexander argues accordingly that the use of a mechanical device to protect one’s
property is permissible, as long as the potential thief is on notice of the presence of the
spring gun. 55
Let us, then, provisionally accept the conclusion that it is permissible to protect
one’s property by use of a spring gun or comparable dangerous device. We come then
to a third issue. Suppose that the homeowner were to arm himself with a “spring” gun
that required manual activation for purpose of protecting his property with deadly
force. This is, of course, precisely the move that courts and criminal codes regard as
impermissible. But notice: If it is permissible to threaten to use deadly force to
protect property, and permissible to set up an automatic execution device to make
such a threat credible, how could it be impermissible for a homeowner to use manual
force to do the same? In other words, if the threat to use force is permissible, clearly
advertised, and sincerely meant, then an actual shooting ought to be permissible in
case someone actually attempts to steal the television, whether that shooting is a
mechanized response to a wrongful act or a manual one. But if this is correct, we
have bootstrapped ourselves into the conclusion that using deadly force to protect
property is permissible, despite our firm assumption at the outset that it is not. 56 Has
something gone wrong? 57
One rather suspects something has, yet it is difficult to identify the precise flaw
in the argument. To recap, the first crucial step was to say that it may be permissible
to defend property with a threat to use deadly force, under circumstances in which it
would not be permissible actually to use it. The second was to say that if the threat
was sincerely issued, and was permissible qua threat, then it should be permissible to
set up a device, such as a spring gun, that would automatically carry out the threat.
And the third was to say that if it is permissible to use an automatic retaliation device
to make good on a sincerely issued, legitimate, threat to use force, then it should be
permissible to do the same without the automatic execution device but manually
55

Id. at 216. Strictly speaking, it is not clear why Alexander thinks the point depends on notice,
since surely one is not obligated to put the thief on notice before stashing one’s jewels on a remote
mountaintop. But admittedly the implications of eliminating notice would be particularly far-reaching,
since it would suggest that the state may punish preventive action to forestall another’s wrongdoing
without even warning potential malefactors of the possible consequences of their behavior.
56
Id.
57
For further discussion of the nature of deterrent threats in the law-enforcement context, see
Claire Finkelstein, Threats and Preemptive Practices, 5 LEGAL THEORY 311 (1999).
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instead. It was in this way that we moved from the permissibility of threatening more
than it is permissible to do, to the permissibility of doing the very thing assumed to be
impermissible. Which step might we best reject?
First, we could reject the suggestion that it is permissible to issue a sincere threat
to use more force than it is, prima facie, permissible to use. Against this position,
however, lies the compelling intuition that threatening to use force is simply not the
same as using force. And further, as we have seen, threatening to kill may be the least
invasive way to forestall another’s wrongdoing, and thus arguably it is to be preferred
as compared with more severe invasions of personal freedom and bodily integrity,
such as attempting to deter future wrongdoers by punishing strenuously after the fact.
It seems difficult to reject this step.
Second, we could accept the suggestion that it is permissible to threaten to do
more than it is permissible actually to do, but reject the permissibility of installing an
automatic device as a way of enforcing the threat. That would require us, among
other things, to distinguish the installation of such devices from merely hiding one’s
property in a dangerous place and keeping it there even though the thief has informed
us that he will keep searching until he finds it or is killed in the process. As we have
seen, this is not an easy distinction to defend.
Third, we could reject the move from automatic threat execution to manual threat
execution. That is, someone might say it is permissible to set up a spring gun or other
automatic device to make good on a deterrent threat, and permissible therefore for that
device to fire should the threat fail to deter, but that this is entirely different from
choosing to follow up on a deterrent threat with a separate, intentional act. The
legitimacy of the threat—justified as it is by the fact that it stands a high likelihood of
deterring the wrongful act with a low probability of having to inflict actual harm—
serves to justify only one act, and in many cases that single, emphatic act of
threatening is worth the costs. In other words, the cost-benefit analysis that allows us
to justify threatening to use deadly force also justifies the entire set-up (threat and
automatic execution device), when the two can both be justified in a single, up-front
act. In the case of manual threat execution, by contrast, the second act—pulling the
trigger of the gun when the threat fails to deter—must be justified only after the
justification for issuing the threat has passed. We know at this second stage that the
threat has failed to deter, and there is nothing further to be gained from actually
making good on the threat. So arguably the case is entirely different when the threat
must be executed with human deliberation than when it can be executed
automatically. Now if the threat fails to deter, the agent must reflect on whether to
pull the trigger, and there seems to be nothing one can say to justify pulling the trigger
at this point. Since no deterrent or preventive rationale can apply, the only
justification would be retributive, and it is clearly not retributively permissible to
inflict the death penalty for theft.
There are, however, serious objections that can be leveled at this third attempt to
avoid the bootstrapping argument. Most compelling, perhaps, is the fact that the line
between spring guns and manual use of lethal force seems a highly artificial one.
While the one act/two act distinction carries some plausibility, it is not hard to
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imagine that an agent can make his own actions nearly as automatic as the actions of a
spring gun, simply by refusing to reconsider his own plan. Alternatively put, the
“plan” of issuing the deterrent threat and then making good on it should the threat fail
to deter provides the same glue between the earlier act of threatening and the later act
of shooting as the automatic mechanism of the spring gun. There is a rich literature in
philosophical rational choice theory on the topic of so-called “resolute choice.” One
of us has defended a version of the resolute view in the context of debates about the
nature of rationality and planning agency. 58 While this is not the place to recapitulate
all the arguments in favor of resolute choice in the rationality literature, it should
suffice to notice the moral implausibility of distinguishing pre-commitment from
resolution in the context of threat execution. If a human being can make himself into
a kind of automatically firing spring gun by steeling himself for the task and refusing
to reconsider should his threat fail to deter, then his shooting would appear to be every
bit as justified as hooking up a spring gun to do the same.
If, as we have suggested, none of the available solutions for avoiding the
bootstrapping problem turns out to be compelling, we are left to consider whether we
cannot after all make our peace with the idea that though it is impermissible generally
to use lethal force in defense of property, it may be permissible to do so in the context
of an overall justified plan involving the issuance of a legitimate deterrent threat.
Similarly, though it would not be morally permissible to inflict a massive first strike
on an enemy in wartime, it may be permissible to inflict such harm by way of
retaliation for a deterrent threat justifiably issued that failed to deter. One must be
careful here. It is not as though any deterrent threat and its follow-through can be
justified by this bootstrapping argument. For sometimes the entire package—threat
plus follow-through—is insufficiently justified by the interest we are trying to protect.
Would it be legitimate, for example, to threaten to issue a nuclear strike to prevent
someone from trespassing on one’s lawn? Presumably not. The entire package—
threat plus follow-through—must be justified in terms of the underlying interest being
protected. Elsewhere, one of us has discussed this question in detail, and has tried to
offer an account of how this kind of package justification might be thought to work. 59
It should at any rate improve the plausibility of the bootstrapping view to see that any
such account will be subject to an internal proportionality requirement. 60
In our view, the question explored in this section is part and parcel of a more
general question in moral reasoning: Does embedding an impermissible act in a plan it
is morally permissible to adopt change the moral status of the acts that make up the
plan? In other words, does the moral permissibility of the plan translate into the moral
58

Claire Finkelstein, Acting on an Intention, in REASON, INTENTION AND MORALITY (Gijs Van
Donselaar & Bruno Verbeek eds., Ashgate Publishing,forthcoming 2008).
59
See Claire Finkelstein, Acting on an Intention, supra note 58; see also Claire Finkelstein,
Constrained Maximization and Risk (Oct. 20, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
60
This is a point Alexander appears to miss, and he seems to suppose that given the existence of
notice, any deterrent threat, and hence potential follow-through, can be made legitimate. In our view he
misperceives the justifying element. It is not the notice itself that provides the justification for enhanced
force, but rather what we might call the logic of the package deal.
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permissibility of the individual acts called for by the plan? It is precisely the reverse
of the question we addressed in connection with the Actio Libera in Causa, where we
asked whether an otherwise permissible act (such as self-defense) can be rendered
impermissible by the fact that it partakes in an overall plan it was impermissible for
the agent to adopt. In the next section, we turn to a more specific comparison of the
Actio Libera in Causa situation and the problem of deterrent threats, in the hope that
their juxtaposition will serve to illuminate each with the insights gained from the
other.
IV. CONTRIVED DEFENSES AND DETERRENT THREATS COMPARED
We began by noting that the problem of contrived defenses and that of deterrent
threats are mirror images of one another: The former involves prima facie permissible
acts embedded in an overall impermissible plan, while the latter involves prima facie
impermissible acts embedded in an overall permissible plan. If we are correct in
identifying this symmetry between the cases, one might expect the various available
positions on each topic to admit of a corresponding position on the other. This is
indeed what we find when we directly compare the various positions we have
explored. Let us begin by attempting to transpose the analysis we just gave of the
problem of deterrent threats into the Actio Libera in Causa situation. We will then
consider the reverse transposition, namely the implications of the various positions on
the Actio Libera in Causa for available positions on deterrent threats.
First, notice that in both cases we have two stages, which together form the entire
plan. Suppose we begin by correlating the threatening stage in the deterrent threat
situation with the contrivance stage in the Actio Libera situation. The threat execution
stage then corresponds to the stage at which the defendant performs the prima facie
criminal act in the Actio Libera situation. In both cases there is an overall plan that
ties the first and the second stage together. 61 Now recall our first premise in the
deterrent threat argument. There we saw that someone might wish to deny the
permissibility of threatening to do more than it is actually permissible to do. Someone
who took this position would reason, by backwards induction, about which threats it is
permissible to issue, based on those actions it is permissible to perform at the second
stage. The same kind of backwards induction would lead to a clear position in the
Actio Libera situation. If we endorse the Backward Induction View in this case, we
would be led to say that since killing with a justification or excuse is permissible (i.e.,
non-culpable), then the contrived plan, or the intention, to kill in that state would also
be permissible.

61
There is an asymmetry in the relationship between the first and the second stages, however, in
the two contexts. The agent hopes not to reach the second stage in the deterrent threat situation, whereas
his plan presupposes that he will reach the second stage in the Actio Libera situation. But this is just to
say that his intent regarding the second stage is conditional in the deterrent threat situation and
unconditional in the Actio Libera case, and it does not seem to make comparisons less fruitful across the
two types of situations.
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Take, for example, the defendant who contrives to kill someone in self-defense.
Or consider the defendant who ensures that he is in a state of such irresponsibility that
he cannot help himself from killing his victim. These defendants are intending to do
something which, considered in and of itself, is perfectly permissible: killing someone
in self-defense, or killing someone in a state of irresponsibility. So it looks as though
the first of the positions we considered above, which denies the premise that it is
permissible to threaten more than it is permissible to do, would translate into a denial
that there is any problem about contrived defenses. The defendant still retains the
benefit of any defense he contrives, and the larger plan invalidates nothing.
Now consider the mirror image of the position that says, on the contrary, it is
permissible to threaten more than it is permissible to do. In the Actio Libera kind of
case, this would translate into an argument that despite the permissibility of killing in
self-defense, it is in fact impermissible to contrive to do that which it is permissible to
do. The moral character of the act itself does not determine the permissibility of the
intention leading to that act. Interestingly enough, many people who would endorse
liability in the Actio Libera cases would also want to endorse liability in the case of
deterrent threats and deny the permissibility of issuing such threats. A more natural
position for someone inclined to favor liability in the case of contrived defenses,
however, is to affirm the permissibility of deterrent threats.
Let us now turn to the second question we considered in the previous section,
namely whether it is permissible to use an automatic retaliation device to make a
deterrent threat more credible. The corresponding case in the Actio Libera context
would be one in which acting on the contrivance was no longer under the defendant’s
control. Thus suppose the defendant has himself hypnotized to kill his wife. The
operation of the hypnotic state is like the spring gun, in that the defendant proceeds to
execute the plan on automatic pilot. Like the decision to set up the spring gun in the
first place, the only voluntary actions were performed earlier, at the moment of
contrivance, and the defendant was thereafter the proverbial “bullet in flight.” The
position of those who think that if manually defending property with deadly force is
impermissible, then the use of spring guns is also impermissible, would translate into
the position that if killing under hypnosis is permissible in the sense of being excused,
then arranging for oneself to kill under hypnosis is also permissible. The automaticity
of the mechanism by which one performs a justified action appears to be a more
emphatic way of contriving or intending to perform a justified action. 62 The person
who therefore thinks that one does not lose the defense if one contrives it should not
be put off by the use of an automatic plan-execution device, such as hypnosis. The
defendant who arranges for himself to automatically perform a permissible action
would still be able to claim the benefit of the excuse or justification.

62
The point is a bit trickier for excused than for justified criminal behavior, as it is hard to
consider killing in an irresponsible state as permissible in the way we would regard killing in self-defense
as permissible. But this is a wrinkle we will overlook here, as it seems likely some structural adjustments
could be made in the argument to account for it.
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Finally, consider the third step in the argument in favor of following through on
permissible threats in the deterrent threat case. That stage, to recall, maintained that if
it is permissible to back up a deterrent threat with an automatic retaliation device like
a spring gun, it must be permissible to do the same manually, without the automatic
device. This was what we called the bootstrapping argument. What is the
bootstrapping argument in the Actio Libera situation? It would be the suggestion that
if it is impermissible to contrive to kill someone “automatically,” i.e., through a device
like hypnosis, then the actual killing performed under hypnosis must be considered
impermissible as well. In other words, we can hold the defendant liable not only on
the basis of what he does at the planning stage, but on the basis of what he does
pursuant to that plan. On this view, we would have bootstrapped our way into an
argument against the permissibility of certain kinds of excused or justified actions,
despite the fact that the defendant’s conduct as such merits a defense. On this view,
we must examine the larger circumstances in which a defendant acts in order to know
whether he truly merits a defense it would otherwise appear he can claim.
Thus the bootstrapping logic that looked so questionable in the context of
deterrent threats now seems perfectly palatable in the context of the Actio Libera in
Causa. That logic suggests that we must assess plans—and component parts of those
plans—in the context of the overall moral character of the entire package. As we have
seen, the legitimacy of a particular deterrent threat must be assessed in the context of
the overall justifiability of the plan to threaten, and eventually to follow through, in
order to deter someone else’s wrongdoing. And just as we saw there must be a
proportionality restriction on the kinds of threats we can justify with bootstrapping
arguments, so there must be restrictions on which contrived defenses we can
invalidate with this method. Contriving to steal a loaf of bread by starving oneself
until one is in a life threatening condition may not warrant invalidating the defense for
the sake of recognizing the impermissibility of the contrivance, just as threatening the
use of nuclear weapons is not warranted to deter trespassers. But these substantive
considerations would require much greater elaboration before the plan-based logic we
have suggested would provide a clear method of analysis. Here we have sought only
to establish the parallels between these two problems in the criminal law, and to
suggest a way of reasoning about both types of situations that appears to produce
plausible conclusions.
So far we have examined what the different approaches one might take to the
deterrent threat problem would imply for the problem of contrived defenses. Let us
now consider how our analysis of the deterrent threat problem helps us to deepen our
understanding of the different theories scholars have proposed to deal with contrived
defenses: the traditional approach, the perpetration-by-means approach, and Joachim
Hruschka’s Ausnahmemodell, or secondary duty theory.
To simplify things, let us simply consider the two most extreme approaches
people have taken to the deterrent threat problem. At one end, there is the approach
that says that since it is immoral to kill someone to defend one’s property, it is also
immoral to intend to do so, to threaten to do so, or to set up a mechanical device that
would do so. Since this approach has us reason from the immorality of the final act to
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the immorality of all earlier behavior that produces it, we noted that this approach is
sometimes called the Backward Induction View. At the other extreme was the
approach that said that since it is permissible to threaten more force than one is
ordinarily allowed to employ, it is also permissible to set up a mechanical device that
would kill the thief, or even to kill the thief oneself, provided one does so as part of a
general defense strategy. We called this approach, which has us reason from the
morality of the overall defensive strategy to the morality of all of its component
actions, the Bootstrapping Argument.
If we look at the traditional approach in light of the Backward Induction View
and the Bootstrapping Argument we might notice some interesting parallels. The first
is that the traditional approach is very similar to the Backward Induction View and
very different from the Bootstrapping Argument. Like the Backward Induction View,
it has us reason from the immorality of the individual actions of the defendant to the
overall morality of his actions. The traditional approach says that the defendant is
doing nothing wrong when he defends himself at the second stage, but that he is doing
something wrong when he sets things up that way at the first stage, since at that first
stage he cannot claim the benefit of self-defense. That is precisely the sort of act-byact logic exhibited by the Backward Induction View.
There is something else, however, which the Backward Induction View can teach
us about the traditional approach. Upon close examination of the parallel between the
two, it becomes apparent that the way the traditional approach uses the act-by-act
logic is defective. Instead of saying that at T1 the defendant is causing death at T2 and
is doing so at a time when he cannot claim self-defense, a different description of the
situation would be more consistent with the Backward Induction View. For that view
suggests we focus on what the defendant is doing at the final stage, T2,which in this
case is killing in self-defense, and then to infer from that the moral status of his
behavior at the initial stage, T1. On this way of thinking, the Backward Induction
View actually suggests that we should say that the defendant at T1 is causing death at
T2 by way of self-defense. If we put the matter this way, it would seem as though the
defendant is doing nothing wrong, since he is causing himself to do something
perfectly legitimate, namely kill in self-defense. What the Backward Induction View
reveals is that the traditional approach does not do what its adherents claim it does: it
does not in fact help to rationalize our intuition that a defendant should not be able to
make a self-defense argument if the defense was contrived. Quite the contrary, it
suggests that he should be able to do so.
If we were to reconsider the perpetration-by-means approach in light of the
foregoing discussion, we would find something analogous: the perpetration-by-means
approach, like the traditional approach, is actually quite close to the Backward
Induction View, as it too relies on a kind of act-by-act logic according to which we
must infer the morality of a course of action from the morality of its individual parts.
And one would finally find that the perpetration-by-means approach, like the
traditional approach, has generally been misunderstood. Correctly applied, this view
also suggests that the creator of contrived defenses should be acquitted rather than
convicted.

504

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 5:479

Things stand very differently with Hruschka’s secondary duty theory. On close
examination, Hruschka’s theory turns out to be quite similar to the Bootstrapping
Argument and very different from the Backward Induction View. That is because
fundamentally Hruschka’s approach has us evaluate the defendant’s course of conduct
in its totality, and then assess the individual components of that course of action
accordingly. Hruschka has us look at the course of conduct as a whole, and if we find
that we disapprove, to recognize a secondary duty not to create situations that would
require the defendant to perform the illegal, but ostensibly justified or excused, action.
The Bootstrapping Argument would in parallel fashion have us look at the entire
course of conduct of the designer of the deterrent threat arrangement, and if we find
that we approve of it, to approve as well of its individual components, including the
decision to use deadly force to kill a thief at the second stage. In this way we can see
that Hruschka’s approach is actually the only one that can satisfactorily rationalize the
intuition of those who want to deny the contriver his defense.
That does not prove that the secondary duty theory is right, but it puts a high
price on its rejection. For if we reject it, the logic of such cases will push us to
approve of the use of contrived defenses, which many find unintuitive, and to reject
deterrent arrangements which many find more palatable.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented a long and complex argument designed to demonstrate the
parallel between the problem of contrived defenses and that of deterrent threats. In
our view, these two situations display a surprising symmetry once one notices that the
agent in each case causes himself to perform an action whose moral character is at
odds with the moral character of the overall plan from which he acts. Realizing this
symmetry one acquires a potent tool for discriminating among different solutions to
each of the problems. We are inclined to conclude that the resolution that proves able
to deal most consistently and least counterintuitively with both problems is something
along the lines of Hruschka’s secondary duty solution to the Actio Libera problem, on
the one hand, and the Boostrapping solution to the deterrent threat problem, on the
other. This also suggests that plan-based approaches to problems of rational and
ethical choice should be taken seriously, as it appears that many of our intuitive
responses to ethical dilemmas can be best rationalized once we adopt a plan-based
perspective.

